Evolution of a predictive internal model in an embodied and situated agent by Gigliotta, Onofrio et al.
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Evolution of a Predictive Internal Model in an Embodied and Situated
Agent
Onofrio Gigliotta · Giovanni Pezzulo · Sefano Nolfi
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract We show how simulated robots evolved for the ability to display a context-dependent periodic
behavior can spontaneously develop an internal model and rely on it to fulfill their task when sensory
stimulation is temporarily unavailable. The analysis of some of the best evolved agents indicates that their
internal model operates by anticipating sensory stimuli. More precisely, it anticipates functional proper-
ties of the next sensory state rather than the exact state that sensors will assume. The characteristics of
the states that are anticipated and of the sensorimotor rules that determine how the agents react to the
experienced states, however, ensure that they produce very similar behaviour during normal and blind
phases in which sensory stimulation is available or is self-generated by the agent, respectively. Agents’
internal models also ensure an effective transition during the phases in which agents’ internal dynamics
is decoupled and re-coupled with the sensorimotor flow. Our results suggest that internal models might
have arisen for behavioral reasons, and successively exapted for other cognitive functions. Moreover, the
obtained results suggest that self-generated internal states should not necessarily match in detail the
corresponding sensory states and might rather encode more abstract and motor-oriented information.
Keywords Internal models · Evolutionary robotics · Prediction
1 Introduction
The idea that cognitive agents act on the basis of internal models can be considered foundational in
cognitive science; consider for example Craik’s (1943) internal models, Tolman’s (1948) cognitive maps,
or Johnson-Laird’s (1983) mental models. The structure and functioning of internal models is however
much more debated.
Traditional theories in cognitive science describe internal models as mental maps that support plan-
ning by means of symbolic representations, whose representational content is conceptual and is not tied
to any sensorimotor modality (see Johnson-Laird, 1980 for a review). The de-emphasization of sym-
bolic representations in cognitive science has determined a loss of attention for internal models in the
traditional sense. The emphasis on the embodied and situated nature of intelligence and behavior has
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Fig. 1 Comparison between purely stimulus-response systems (b) and those endowed with anticipatory capabilities, which
run an ‘internal loop’ on-line with action (b), or off-line (c).
lead instead to a non-representational and reactive view, whose most popular example in behavior-based
robotics is the slogan that “the world is its own best model” (Brooks, 1991).
Recently, however, the idea of internal modeling is gaining consensus anew, as numerous researchers in
cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and robotics have (re)integrated the ideas of internal modeling in an
embodied view of cognition, thus essentially abandoning symbolic representations in favor of sensorimotor
codes. For example Wolpert et al. (1995) claim that in many cases action is goal-directed and supported
by internal models. Moreover, there is a vast literature that show how prediction and internal models
play an important role in (visuo)motor control (Kawato, 1999; Miall and Wolpert, 1996) and in the
stabilization of perception (von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950), allow to circumvent the problems caused
by the delay with which sensory information reach the central nervous system (during the execution of
fast reaching movements (Cerminara et al., 2009; Desmurget and Grafton, 2000) or during walking and
posture control behavior (von Hofsten, 2004)), and allow to cancel self-produced stimuli so to focus the
attention on relevant external stimuli (Webb, 2004). The idea of internal modeling is not confined to the
motor domain but it is increasingly being used as a unifying concept that relates sensorimotor, cognitive
and social abilities, including for example off-line motor planning, motor imagery, reasoning, imitation,
mindreading, and cooperation (Frith et al., 2000; Grush, 2004; Jeannerod, 2006; Pezzulo, 2011; Schubotz,
2007; Wolpert et al., 2003). Recently, numerous empirical studies have focused on the neural correlates of
internal models (Ebner and Pasalar, 2008; Imamizu et al., 2003), thus complementing previous theoretical
and physiological analyses (Erlhagen, 2003; Kawato, 1999; Mehta and Schaal, 2002; Miall and Wolpert,
1996).
1.1 Structure and functioning of internal models
Internal models come in (at least) two varieties: inverse models and forward models. The former compute
the motor command that produces a desired state in a certain condition, and the latter predict the sensory
consequences of the execution of a motor command.
Fig. 1 highlights the differences between (a) a stimulus-response system, and (b) one endowed with
(multiple pairs of) internal, forward and inverse models, which is inspired by the architecture for motor
control described in (Wolpert et al., 1998). In the latter, the internal models (inverse and forward) realize
an inner loop, which parallels actual sensorimotor interaction and mimics its input-output properties.
Such loops can function on-line with action (b), or off-line (c), that is, detached from the current senso-
rimotor context. When this last condition holds, sensory inputs are substituted by predicted inputs, and
motor outputs are inhibited.
This novel view of internal modeling, which incorporates control-theoretic ideas and an embodied
view of cognition, is clearly synthesized in the emulation theory of representation proposed by Grush
(2004, p. 1):
in addition to simply engaging with the body and environment, the brain constructs neural circuits
that act as models of the body and environment. During overt sensorimotor engagement, efference
copies (von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950) in parallel with the body and environment drive these
models, in order to provide expectations of the sensory feedback, and to enhance and process
sensory information. These models can also be run off-line in order to produce imagery, estimate
outcomes of different actions, and evaluate and develop motor plans.
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A related view is put forward by Hesslow (2002), who describes associative mechanisms as responsible
of internal simulations of perception and behavior1. Both views emphasize that anticipation is a key
element of internal models, and that predicting the effects of one’s own actions can be used to improve
motor control and can be at the basis of higher level cognitive skills (see also Pezzulo, 2011 for a
discussion).
In this paper we focus our attention on the origins of internal models and on their use for on-line
control of action in situations in which sensory information is temporarily unavailable. Other possible
uses of internal models will be discussed in the concluding section and demanded to future investigations.
1.2 The origins of internal models
Why and how did internal models originate during the evolutionary history of living organisms? One
possible answer to this question is that internal models might had arisen to improve motor control and
might had been recruited to play additional functions (e.g. planning) later on (Pezzulo and Castelfranchi,
2007, 2009). More specifically, internal models might had arisen to cope with unreliability, and/or tem-
porarily lack of sensory information and with the temporal delay with which sensory information reach
the central nervous system. Indirect evidence in support to this hypothesis comes from evidences indicat-
ing that the human brain rely on prediction to deal with noise in motor control (Kording and Wolpert,
2006), and to compensate for transmission delays (Sheth et al., 2000).
Synthetic methodologies such us evolutionary robotics (Nolfi and Floreano, 2000), that allow to study
how robots change evolutionarily while they attempt to adapt to a given task/environment, can provide
complementary evidence. In particular, they can allow us to verify experimentally whether and in which
conditions robots evolve an internal model, how such internal model is organized, and how it contributes
to improve robots’ performance.
1.3 Objectives of the study and relation to the state of the art
The primary goal of this paper is that to verify through a synthetic methodology whether internal models
could spontaneously arise in living organisms for the sake of effective motor control. More specifically, in
this paper we investigate whether artificial embodied agents, that are trained for the ability to exhibit a
given behavioral skill (but are neither designed nor rewarded for prediction), develop and use an internal
model that allow them to anticipate forthcoming stimuli to overcome the problems caused by the fact
that sensory stimulation is temporarily missing.
The rationale behind our hypothesis is that, in the attempt to solve a problem that require to display
a certain behavior during phases in which sensory stimuli are and are not available, the evolving robots
will initially develop partial solutions that allow them to behave appropriately during the former but not
during the latter phases by reacting appropriately to the experienced sensory stimuli. At this stage of the
evolutionary process, agents might further improve their skill either by (1) developing a new behavioral
strategy that allows them to behave appropriately also when sensory stimuli are not available, or (2)
developing an ability to self-generate missing stimuli and react to both available and self-generated
sensory stimuli on the basis of the previously developed behavioral strategy.
To verify whether this hypothesis holds, we ran and analyzed a series of experiments in which a
population of robots is evolved for the ability to perform a simple behavior by keep producing it also
when sensory stimulation is temporarily missing.
The fact that biological organisms can overcome the problem caused by the temporarily lack of
sensory information has been demonstrated, for example, in the experimental study carried out by (Lee
and Thompson, 1982). In this work a group of blindfolded human subjects were asked to perform a
series of task (e.g. walking to a given marked location, avoiding obstacles, and throwing objects toward
different locations of the room) after having been asked to observe the room in which they were located
and to direct their attention toward specific objects and markers. The fact that the subjects were able
to accomplish these tasks rather well and almost as accurately with respect to a control situation in
1 It is worth noting, however, that the simulation hypothesis is presented by Hesslow (2002) as an associative and non rep-
resentational view, whilst the emulation theory of representation of Grush (2004) describes inner loops as representational.
We will come back to this point in the final discussion.
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which they were not blindfolded clearly indicates that they are able to compensate the lack of visual
information through some form of internal process.
As far as we know, the first and only attempt to verify whether an artificial agent evolved for the
ability to display a behavior (that crucially depends from the agent/environmental relation) can cope
with the temporarily lack of sensory information is that reported in (Ziemke et al., 2002, 2005). In
this work, the authors evolved a population of simulated wheeled robots for the ability to move along
a square corridor in a normal and in a blind condition (during which sensory information was or was
not available, respectively). The robots sensors included only a linear camera able to detect four visual
landmarks located at the four corresponding edges of the corridor.
The analysis of the best individual reported in the paper indicates that during normal phases the
robot accomplished the task by moving forward while slightly turning toward right, when the robot
visually detects a landmark, and by turning right otherwise. The former behavior allows the robot to
lose visual contact with the landmark toward the end of each corridor. The latter behavior allows the
robot to negotiate a corner and to orient itself toward the following landmark. During blind phases the
robot solved the problem by executing the same two behaviors (i.e. move forward while slightly turning
toward the right and turn right). In this case, however, the arbitration between the two behaviors is not
based on the current state of the vision sensors but rather on the state of the internal neurons that keep
trace of time passed executing the current behavior. This information about time duration is used by
the robot to switch between the first and the second behavior and vice versa after 30 and 5 time steps,
respectively. This means that, in the case of these experiments, the evolved agents relies on two different
strategies: (1) a reactive strategy, executed during normal phases, in which the action performed depends
on the visual pattern currently perceived by the robot, and (2) a strategy, executed during blind phases,
in which the action performed depends from the time spent by the robot executing the current action.
The combination of these two strategies, however, allows the robot to effectively master the transition
between normal and blind phases only occasionally. Indeed, in the majority of the cases, shortly after
sensory states are no longer available, the robot crashes against walls as a consequence of the fact that
it switches between the two actions too early or too lately. The fact that the problem concerns the
transitions between normal and blind phases is demonstrated by the fact that during the blind phases
in which the robot happens to make the first switch at the right time, it also manages to successfully
master the next switches.
The analysis of the obtained results also demonstrated how, contrary to the authors’ expectation, the
evolved agents did not rely on an internal model and on an ability to internally generate the simulated
experience of the stimuli that are temporarily missing. In other words, the lack of sensory information
was not compensated by an ability to internally generate states that are identical or similar to those
that would have been experienced during normal phases but rather through the generation of a different
type of information (that encode the time spent by the robot executing the current action) and through
the exhibition of two different strategies during normal and blind phases based on visual information
and on time-duration information, respectively. Moreover, the combination of these two strategies, did
not allow to appropriately master the transition between normal and blind phases in most of the cases
thus leading to rather low performance during blind phases, on the average. In the experiment reported
in this paper, instead, some of the evolved agents self-generate internal states that provide functionally
equivalent information to that normally provided by sensors. Moreover, evolving agents display an ability
to appropriately master the transition between normal and blind phases.
Another related work is constituted by the experiments reported in Beer and Gallagher (1992) and
Beer (1995) in which the authors evolved the neural controller of a simulated hexapod robot for the
ability to walk. For each leg, the agent is provided with two opposing muscles-like effectors that control
the torque applied to the one degree of freedom of the leg, a foot effector that controls whether the foot
is up or down, a sensor that encodes the current angular position of the leg along the frontal/rear arc,
and two internal neurons. The authors compared the results obtained in a normal, a sensory-deprived,
and a mixed condition in which the sensory feedback was always available, was never available, and
was available only in part of the trials, respectively. However, they did not study the case in which
sensory information was missing temporarily after a phase in which it was available as in the case of
the work referred above. Agents evolved in a normal condition displayed a reactive pattern generator
(i.e. a solution in which the state of the motors depends entirely on the current state of the sensors).
Agents evolved in a sensory-deprived condition developed a central pattern generator solution (i.e. a
solution in which the neural controller generated rhythmic movements without relying on any type of
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sensory information). Agents evolved in the mixed condition displayed a controller that operates as a
central pattern generator entrained by the rhythmic sensory feedback. As in the case of the controller
evolved in the sensory-deprived condition, this controller produces rhythmic movements during the trials
in which sensory information is not available. However, it also displays an ability to speed-up or slow-
down the oscillatory behavior on the basis of the available sensory-feedback so to adapt the periodic
behavior to the effects of the agent/environmental interaction. This in turn allows the agent to walk
either with or without sensory-feedback and to exploit sensory information, when available, to improve
the walking performance. The fact that the problem admits a sub-optimal but relatively good solution
also without sensory feedback implies that it does not need to replace missing sensory states with some
equivalent self-generated information when sensory information is not available. In this paper instead,
we will study a problem in which the actions that should be produced by the agent crucially depend
from the agent/environmental relation. In this situation agents are forced to find a way to compensate
the lack of sensory information. This in turn, as we will see, allows the agents to display similar behavior
during normal and blind phases, to achieve close to optimal performance also when sensory information
is temporarily unavailable, and to appropriately master the transition between normal and blind phases.
A much larger body of research concerns artificial agents that have been trained to anticipate the
next sensory states. For example, (Wolpert and Kawato, 1998) have studied whether the development
of an internal model can improve motor control. The aim of these studies, however, is not to verify
whether and how internal models could emerge or whether the ability to anticipate the next sensory
states can be used to compensate the lack of sensory information, but rather that to investigate whether
the development of an internal model can support the acquisition of other behavioural or cognitive skills
such as the ability to self-localize in the environment (Nolfi and Tani, 1999), the development of a model
of the robot’s own body (Bongard et al., 2006), the development of an ability to discriminate between
free paths and dead-ends by “mentally simulating” the effect of alternative actions (Hoffmann, 2007;
Moller and Schenck, 2008), the development of an ability to imitate (Demiris and Khadhouri, 2005), the
development of an ability to perform mental inferences (Oztop et al., 2005), and the development of an
ability to manipulate objects (Nishimoto and Tani, 2009).
Another goal of this paper is to verify what type of internal models, if any, evolve. For example do the
evolved internal models anticipate the forthcoming stimuli in detail or do they only anticipate certain
properties of them ? Which is the time scale at which predictions are made? How accurate predictions
are?
Finally, from a technological perspective, our study aims to develop a methodology that can be used
to synthesize artificial embodied agents (robots) able to operate effectively in uncertain conditions.
2 Methodology and experimental scenario
To study the issues described in the previous section, we set up an experimental scenario in which an
holonomic agent provided with an eye should develop an ability to move along a circular trajectory that
allows it to observe a specific portion of the image displayed over a screen situated in front of the agent
(fig. 2, left). More specifically, in each time step the agent should determine how much it has to move its
eye in order to keep looking at different portions of the image located over a circular stripe of the image
itself (fig. 2, right). Such behavior should be exhibited both during normal phases, in which the agent
can infer the portion of the image that it is currently looking at on the basis of the color perceived, and
during blind phases, in which sensory information is temporarily unavailable.
The characteristic of the agent/task/environment has been selected so to identify a scenario that is
relatively simple for what concerns the sensorimotor system of the agent in which, however, the action to
be performed by the agent crucially depends on the relative position of the eye with respect to the image
(that can be inferred with limited precision from noisy sensory states during normal phases only). This
implies that, differently from the case of the experiments reported in Beer and Gallagher (1992), the
task does not admit optimal or close to optimal solutions based on control mechanism that can operate
independently from the current agent/environmental relation.
The choice of a task that requires the execution of a periodic behavior (i.e. that involves the execution
of a series of different actions, that allow the eye of the agent to move along a circular trajectory located
on a specific position of the image, and that have to be repeated several times) has been made to identify
a problem that admits qualitatively different solutions. More precisely, a problem in which the temporary
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Fig. 2 Left: The environment consists of a screen displaying an image composed by the combination of a blue and red
gradients with an intensity that vary linearly along the left-right and bottom-up axis, respectively. Right: The image is
virtually divided into 36 sector areas. The white circle indentifies the portion of image located at a distance of 130 pixels
from the centre of the image along which the agent should keep moving its eye clockwise or anti-clockwise. The white lines
drawn in the image represent a schematization and are not perceived by the agent
lack of sensory information can be solved either by developing and exploiting a form of memory that allows
the agent to produce the right sequence of actions on the basis of a trace of previously executed actions
stored in its internal states, or through the development of an ability to self-generate the missing sensory
states by anticipating the sensory state that would have been experienced on the basis of previously
experienced/self-generated sensory states. For analyses that show how the exhibition of periodic task
such as human locomotion involve the ability to anticipate the next experienced sensory states and to
perform anticipatory adjustments, see (McFadyen and Winter, 1991; McFadyen et al., 2001).
In our experiments, the agents develop their skill through an evolutionary process, are provided with
recurrent neural controllers, and are rewarded for the ability to exhibit the requested behavior only (and
not for the ability to predict the next stimuli).
2.1 The agent, the environment, and the task
The agents consists of a simulated eye provided with a single photoreceptor located in front of a screen
showing an 500x500 pixel image generated by the combination of a blue and red gradient ranging con-
tinuously from 0 to 255 along the left-right and the top-down dimensions, respectively (see fig. 2, left).
Each time step, the photoreceptor detects the intensity (normalized within [0.0, 1.0]) of the blue and red
in the pixel corresponding to the current position of the eye. Noise is simulated by adding in each time
step to the intensity of each color a random value with a uniform distribution within [-0.05, 0.05]. The
agent is also provided with two motors that allow it to move left-right and/or top-down, with respect to
its current position, up to a maximum of ± 5 pixels along each axis.
The task of the agent consists in navigating clockwise or anti-clockwise around the centre of the image
at a distance of 130 pixels, so to keep moving along the different virtual sectors of the image shown in
fig. 2, (left) and so to maintain a constant distance from the centre of the image.
2.2 Agent’s neural controller
The agent’s controller consists of an artificial neural network. We replicated the experiment four times
by using four different neural architectures (see fig. 3).
In all cases, the network is provided with: two sensory neurons (B1 and R1) that encode the intensity
of blue and red colour currently sensed by the photoreceptor of the eye (B and R) perturbed by noise
or the state of the H2 internal neurons at time t-1 (see explanation below), eight internal neurons (H1),
and two motor neurons (M1, M2) that determine the amplitude of the eye movement with respect to
its current position along the left-right and top-down dimension within a range of [-5,5] pixels. The
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 3 The four architectures of agents’ neural controller used in four corresponding experiments. R and B encode the
intensity of blue and red colour currently sensed by the photoreceptor of the eye. B1 and R1 encode the state of B and R
or the state of H2 (see text for explanation). H1 and H2 are internal neurons. M1 and M2 are used to update the robot’s
position. G indicate a thresholded internal neurons that control whether the state of the sensory neurons B1 and R1 is
updated on the basis of the state of the sensors (B and R) or on the basis of the state of the H2 internal neurons. Rectangles
indicate blocks of neurons. Full arrows indicate connections between blocks of neurons. Dashed arrows indicate efferent
copies.
H1 internal neurons receive connections from the sensory neurons and from themselves. Some of the
architectures are also provided with two additional internal neurons (H2). The motor neurons (M1 and
M2) and H2 internal neurons (when present) receive connection from the H1 internal neurons.
Architecture A is provided with the sensory neurons (B1 and R1) that are always set on the basis
of sensors (B and R), eight internal neurons (H1), and two motor neurons (M1 and M2). Architecture
B is also provided with a second layer of internal neurons (H2) and two additional neurons (H21) that
encode the state of H2 neurons at time t-1. The rationale between the use of this architecture is that it
can facilitate the development of solutions that rely on sensory or on self-generated internal states during
normal and blind phases, respectively. Architecture C is also provided with a built-in gating mechanism
that ensures that the state of the sensory neurons (B1 and R1) is set on the basis of the state of the
sensors (B and R) during normal phases and on the basis of the state of the two internal neurons (H2) at
time t-1 during blind phases. The rationale between the use of this architecture is that the presence of a
mechanism that forces the agent to rely on sensory information while neglecting self-generated internal
states and vice versa (depending on whether sensory information is or is not available, respectively) can
facilitate the development of solutions that operate by self-generating the missing sensory information
during blind phases. Architecture D is also provided with an additional internal neuron (G) that is used
to determine at each time step whether the state of the sensory neurons (B1 and R1) is set on the
basis of the sensors (B and R) or on the basis of the state of the two internal neurons (H2) at time
t-1. The rationale between the use of this architecture is that to verifying whether leaving the agent
free to determine when to use sensory or internal states can be advantageous, and whether the agent
can successfully co-develop an ability to self-generate the missing sensory information and an ability to
determine when to use sensory or self-generated states.
The sensory neurons are relay units that are activated on the basis of the intensity of the colours
detected by the photoreceptor perturbed by noise.
Internal neurons are leaky integrators (i.e. neurons that hold a certain amount of the previous acti-
vation) and are updated according to the following equations:




Oj = τjOj(t−1) + (1− τj)(1 + e
−Aj )−1 (2)
0 ≤ τj ≤ 1 (3)
With Aj being the activity of the jth neuron (or the state of the corresponding sensor in the case of
sensory neurons), ϑj the bias of the jth neuron, wij the weight from the ith to the jth neuron, Oi the
output of the ith neuron, τj the time constant of the jth neuron.
7
Motor neurons (M1 and M2) and H2 internal neurons are standard logistic neurons and are activated





The G neuron is a binary neuron that is activated on the basis of the following equation (Gnet is








The architecture of the neural network is fixed. The connection weights and biases and the time
constant of the internal neurons are encoded in free parameters and adapted.
Notice that since the agent is not provided with proprio-sensors encoding information about the actual
position of the eye with respect to the two axes and since the motor neurons encode the movements of
the eye with respect to its current position, the agent’s neural controller does not receive any indication
on its absolute position or on its position on the image during blind phases beside the traces left by the
sensory states experienced during the last normal phase.
2.3 Adaptive algorithm and training procedure
The free parameters of the agent’s neural controller has been adapted through an evolutionary robotics
method (Nolfi and Floreano, 2000). The initial population consists of 100 randomly generated genotypes
which encode the free parameters of 100 corresponding individuals. Each parameter is encoded with 8
bits and is normalized in the interval [-5.0, +5.0] for the biases and the synaptic weights, and in the
interval [0.0, 1.0] for the time constants. Each subsequent population is obtained by selecting the best 20
individuals of the previous population. Each selected individual is allowed to produce 5 offspring that are
generated by duplicating the genotype of the reproducing individuals and by applying mutations (with
2% probability of flipping a bit) to each offspring.
Each individual is tested for 20 trials. At the beginning of each trial the eye is placed randomly in
one of ten different positions distributed uniformously around the centre of the image at a distance of
130 pixels. The agent is then allowed to interact with the environment up to 4000 time steps. For each
time step, the state of the agent’s sensory neurons is updated on the basis of the current position of
the eye, the state of the internal and motor neurons is updated, and the agent’s eye is moved on the
basis of the current state of the motor neurons. The agent experiences a sequence of phases in which
sensory information is available (normal phases) or missing (blind phases). During the first half of each
trial (i.e. during the first 2000 time steps) the agent has always access to the sensory stimulation coming
from the environment (normal phase). During the next half of the trial, instead, the agent experiences
an alternation of blind and normal phases with the same length. The length of these phases varies from
1 to 21 time steps during the 20 corresponding trials.
The performance (fitness) of the individuals during a trial is computed on the basis of the following
equation that rewards individuals for the ability to visit subsequent sectors of the image (clockwise or
anti-clockwise) and for the ability to keep a distance as close as possible to 130 pixels from the centre







36 if 30 ≤ Dt ≤ 230
0 otherwise
(6)
where Dt represents the distance between the point of the image observed by the agent at time t from
the center of the image, and 36 corresponds to the number of sectors. In order to not force the system
to maximize its fitness by moving as fast as possible, the fitness scored during the first 2000 time step is
truncated to 30.
Trials last up to 4000 time steps but are terminated as soon as the agent’s eye looks to a point located
outside the 500x500 pixels area or looks back to a recently visited sector. The total performance of an
individual is calculated by averaging the performance obtained during the 20 trials.
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Table 1 Distribution of solutions for different type of architectures. F1, F2 and F3 indicate the family of the solution.
A,B,C, and D indicate the type of architecture. Each replication of the experiment has been categorized on the basis of
the behavior exhibited by the best evolved individual.
Architectures F1 F2 F3
A 40 0 0
B 40 0 0
C 23 13 4
D 37 2 1
The evolutionary process is continued for 1600 generations. The evolutionary experiment has been
replicated 40 times starting with different, randomly generated, initial populations.
3 Results
By analysing the behaviour and the average performance displayed by evolved individuals we observed
that most of them display optimal or close to optimal performance during normal phases as well as
a good ability to handle short blind phases. However, only some of the individuals provided with the
architecture C and D also demonstrate an ability to handle relatively long blind phases and to generalize
their skill to blind phases lasting 42 and 84 time steps (i.e. two or four times the maximum duration
experienced during the evolutionary process).
The analyses conducted and reported in the next sections indicate that the solutions adopted by
evolving individuals can be categorized in three different families.
The first family includes individuals that display an ability to keep rotating around the centre of
the image during normal phases but not during blind phases. Indeed, in these individuals, the activation
state of the motor neurons immediately or quickly converges on a fixed state, after the transition between
a normal and a blind phase, which leads to the production of a linear trajectory. In other words they are
unable to maintain a self-sustained internal dynamics. In some cases, depending on the relative position
of the agents eye at the beginning of the blind phase, this simple strategy allow the individuals to handle
successfully short blind phases. However, it does not allow to master long blind phases.
On the contrary, the individuals of the second and third family show an ability to keep varying their
motor actions also during blind phases. As we will see, many of the individuals belonging to the second
and third family are able to master long blind phase and to generalize their skill to blind phases lasting
42 and 84 time steps. What differentiates the latter two families is the fact that in the second family the
agents exhibit different behaviors during normal and blind phases, while in the third family the agents
produce similar behavior in the two phases (and we will argue that, to do so, agents develop internal
models; see below).
To discriminate between family 2 and 3 we used two measures of behavior similarity: a) the average
euclidean distance between the state of the motors over time recorded during normal and blind phases
(dmotorsfft) and b) the average correlation between fast fourier transformations of the state of the
motors over time (ρmotorsfft) recorded in normal and blind phases (for more information see below).
The individuals were assigned to family 3 if ρmotorsfft < 0.7 and dmotorsfft < 0.4, and to family 2
otherwise.
The fact that only some of the individuals with the architecture C and D display solutions belonging
to families 2 and 3 (see table 1 indicates that the presence of the gating mechanism (that updates B1 and
R1 on the basis of B and R or H2 during normal and blind phases, respectively) represents a necessary
prerequisites for the development of effective solutions. Moreover, the fact that the number of replication
that lead to family 2 and 3 solutions is significantly higher in the case of the architecture C with respect
to architecture D (17/40 and 3/40, respectively) indicates that the need to also develop an ability to
determine when to rely on sensory or self-generated internal states makes the task harder.
The analysis of the performance of the best evolved individuals of the experiment with architecture
C (fig. 4) indicates that most of the replications lead to optimal or close to optimal performance during
normal phases as well as a good ability to handle blind phases, on the average. Moreover some of them
(fig. 5 and fig. 6) also demonstrate an ability to generalize their skill to blind phases lasting 42 and 84
time steps (i.e. two or four times the maximum duration experienced during the evolutionary process).
9











2 3 4 6 13 16 18 23 24 26 28 33 40
II Family
Replications
1 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 19 20 21 22 27 29 30 31 32 34 36 37 38 39
I Family
Fig. 4 Performance of the best individual of each replication of the experiment with architecture C. The black and white
histograms display the average performance obtained during the first and the second 2000-cycles parts of each trial in
which agents experience a normal only and an alternation of blind and normal phases, respectively. Average performance
calculated over 20 trials. Grey histograms on-top of black histograms indicate the average performance that would have
been obtained during the first part without truncation to 30. See text for explanation.
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Fig. 5 Performance of the best individual of each replication of the experiment with architecture C tested in a control
condition in which normal and blind phases lasting 42 time steps alternate from the beginning of the trial. Average
performance calculated over 20 trials. Note that a few replications (and in particular 4, 6, 24, 28 and 33 for the second
family, and 17 and 25 for the third family) display an ability to generalize their skill in this condition.
Fig. 6 also shows that only the solutions belonging to the second and third families display close to
optimal performance (i.e. performance > 30) when tested on blind phases lasting 84 times steps.
Notice that the differences in performance are not only due to the ability to keep moving by producing
a circular trajectory during blind phases but also to the speed with which the agents circle around the
centre of the image and to the extent to which they succeed in keeping a distance of 130 pixels from the
centre of the image.
The analysis of the performance of the best evolved individuals with architecture D (Fig. 7) displays
qualitatively similar results. In this cases, however, the number of replications that lead to sub-optimal
family-1 solutions is much larger. The analysis of the best individual of the single replication that lead
to a family-3 solution indicates that it relies on the sensory information while neglecting self-generated
states depending on whether the state of the sensors is or not above 0.0. In other words, they evolved a
set of weights that play the same role of the built-in gating mechanisms included in architecture C.
In the following section we analyze in more details the best solutions of each family in the case of the
experiment with architecture C and we describe in more detail how the solutions belonging to family 2
and 3 differ.
3.1 Analysis of the third family of solutions (of architecture C), and its internal modeling strategy
In this section, we analyze in detail the best individual of replication 17, which belongs to the third family
(dmotorsfft = 0.12, ρmotorsfft = 0.98). As we will see, this and the other individuals belonging to this
family possess and rely on an internal model that anticipates relevant characteristics of the forthcoming
sensory stimulus, and allows the agents to display similar effective behaviors during normal and blind
phases as well as during the transition between the two.
A first aspect that we can observe is that this agent displays very similar (and close to optimal)
behaviour during normal and blind phases. Fig. 8 (left) shows the behaviour displayed by the agent, which
is initially provided with external stimuli, and successively (after the first half of the trial) experiences a
blind phase lasting 1000 time steps. We can see how, during the blind phase, the agent keeps producing
10
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Fig. 6 The same as fig. 5, but for phases lasting 84 time steps. Again, note that a few replications (and in particular 4, 6,
24, 28 and 33 for the second family, and 17 and 25 for the third family) display an ability to generalize their skill to blind
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Fig. 7 Performance of the best individual of each replication of the experiment with architecture D tested in a control
condition in which normal and blind phases lasting 84 time steps alternate from the beginning of the trial. Average
performance calculated over 20 trials.

























Fig. 8 Behaviour displayed by the best individual of replication number 17 during a test in which the blind phase last 1000
time steps. Left, trajectory produced during the initial normal phase lasting 2000 time steps and during the succeeding
blind phase lasting 1000 time steps (dark and light lines, respectively). Right: trajectory produced during the last 1000
time step in which the agent has access again to stimulation coming from the external environment.
the same quasi-circular trajectory as in the normal phase, while slowly drifting toward the top-right
part of the image (for an example of how the behavior vary during the two phases in an individual
belonging to family 2, see fig. 14). Moreover, by observing the trajectory produced by the agent during
the successive normal phase (fig. 8, right), we can see how the agent manages to quickly recover from the
drift as soon as the sensory stimulation return available. In other words, the agent is able to (1) de-couple
from external stimuli when they are unavailable, by keep producing a close to optimal behavior, and (2)
re-couple with external stimuli when they are available again.
The fact that the agent manages to keep producing a rather similar motor behaviour during normal
and blind phases is also confirmed by the comparison of how the state of the motors (M1 and M2) varies
over time during normal and blind phases (see fig. 11 and fig. 13, right) and by the comparison of the
fourier transform of the sequence of motor states produced during normal and blind phases (fig. 9).
Overall, these analyses demonstrate that the individual solves the problem by displaying almost
identical behaviour during normal and blind phases. The fact that the behaviours exhibited by the
individual during the two phases are so similar allows the agent to master successfully also relatively
long blind phases. On the other hand, the lack of sensory information can be tolerated only for a limited
11
























































Fig. 9 Fourier transform of M1 and M2 over time (calculated using a standard fast fourier transform algorithm) for the
best individual of replication 17, belonging to the third family. The top and bottom figures correspond to the data collected
during a normal and a blind phase, respectively, lasting 1000 time steps.
amount of time since small differences between the behaviour produced in normal and blind conditions
tend to cumulate over time during blind phases. Finally, the analyses reported above indicate that
the individual is able to tolerate quite well the transition between the normal and blind conditions,
irrespective of the relative position of eye when the transition occurs, and to quickly recover from drift
occurring during blind phases as soon as sensory information returns available. This means that the
internal model does not only successfully compensate for a lack of external input, but also allows a
timely ‘switch’ from the presence to the absence of external stimuli, and vice versa.
3.1.1 Prediction
As discussed in sec. 1, internal models operate by predicting the state that the sensors of the agent will
assume after the execution of a given action. To verify whether the agent predicts at time t the state
that the sensory neurons will assume at time t+1 we recorded and plotted the state of H2 neurons at
time t and the state of neurons (R and B) at time t+1 during normal and blind phases (Fig. 10). The
obtained results indicate that during normal phases the state of the H2 neurons differ significantly from
the state of the sensory neurons. More specifically, the self-generated states vary within the full range
[0.0, 1.0] while the sensory states experienced in normal condition vary within a much smaller range [0.35,
0.65]. Notice also how, beside the range, the shape of the oscillatory curve varies in the two cases. From
this analysis we can conclude that the agent does not predict the exact state that the sensory neurons
would assume at time t+1 in a normal condition. However, further analyses reported below indicate
that it anticipates more abstract properties of how sensory states vary over time, which are sufficient to
maintain the same behavior during normal and blind phases.
This hypothesis is confirmed by the data reported in (Fig. 11) that show how the state of H2 neurons
vary over time during a normal and a blind phase. The comparison indicates that they vary in a rather
similar way independently from the fact that the sensory neurons are feed with actual data collected
from the environment or with self-generated data (i.e. the state of H2 neurons themselves), despite
the two types of data differ significantly. This means that the agent self-generates stimuli that provide
the regularities that are necessary to produce the same behaviour elicited by real stimuli even if the
self-generated and real stimuli differ significantly. This is, in brief, a motor-oriented encoding, which is
functional to enable an appropriate robot’s behavior, rather than a mere replication of the sensations.
Theoretical considerations lead us to hypothesize that, to generate appropriate behavior, and behavior
that is similar in the two conditions (during normal and blind phases), internal models should capture
the essential regularities of the stimuli, while, at the same time, discarding other unnecessary parts. This
constitutes a form of abstraction (see sec. 4 for a discussion of this point). One abstract property of the
12








































Fig. 10 State of the sensors and of H2 neurons during a normal phase. Left: the dark and light lines indicate the state of
neurons R and of the first H2 neuron, respectively. Right: the dark and left light indicate the state of neurons B and of the
second H2 neuron, respectively.
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Fig. 11 State of H2 neurons over time. The dark and light lines indicate the state of the neuron during a normal and
blind phase, respectively. Left: data for the first H2 neuron. Right: data for the second H2 neuron.
sensory flow that could be anticipated by the agent is constituted by the phase with which sensory states
vary over time. To verify whether this hypothesis is true, we carried out a cross-correlation analysis
between the first H2 neuron and R, and the second H2 neuron and B. The analysis of the data collected
during a normal phase (fig. 12, left) indicates that the first H2 neuron at time t oscillates in phase with
R at time t+1 while the oscillation of the second H2 neuron at time t is delayed with respect to that of
B at time t+1. The analysis of the data collected during a blind phase (fig. 12, right) indicates that first
and the second H2 neurons (at time t) are in phase with R and B (at time t+1), respectively.
The presence of a phase correspondence between the state of H2 neurons at time t and the state of
the neurons R and B at time t+1, during blind phases, confirms the hypothesis that the agents’ neural
controller anticipates the phase with which the value of sensory states oscillate over time. This means
that the agent’s internal model is predictive, or, in other terms, that it is an internal forward model,
which encodes transitions from current state and action to future state (i.e.: s, a → st+1)
2
The analysis of the other replications of the experiment belonging to the same family of solutions
provided qualitatively similar results. More precisely, during blind phases the cross-correlation analysis
indicates that the variations of H2 at time t are in phase with variations of R and B at time t+1 in all
the four replications belonging to the third family. During normal phases, instead, the two H2 neurons
oscillate with the same period but with different phases. Usually, the phase of one of the output neuron
anticipates that of the corresponding sensor neuron of [1-5] time steps while the phase of the other output
neuron follow of [1-5] time steps that of the corresponding sensory neuron.
Finally, to understand how self-generated sensory states differ from sensory information gathered
directly from the external environment we computed (see Fig. 13, left) how the point of the image
2 As shown in fig. 1 (b), internal models encode a transition from sensory states and actions to future (predicted) sensory
states (s, a → st+1). This is typically done by giving the forward model an efference copy of the last motor command.
Rather, in our implementation state and action information is available through the connections between H1 and H2.
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fixated by the eye would had varied over time if the state of the H2 neurons would correspond to real
experienced sensory states (i.e. to real perceived colours). As can be seen, the relative positions that
correspond to the self-generated sensory states are squeezed toward the border of the image with respect
to the position really assumed by the eye (Fig. 8). Interestingly, the average discrepancy between the
virtual and the actual position of the eye is low for what concerns the angular information (i.e. the
information which is crucial in order to produce the required exploratory behaviour) while is much
higher for what concerns the distance information. Indeed, by testing the agent for 20 trials with normal
and blind phases lasting 42 time steps we observed that during blind phases the average discrepancy for
what concerns the angle with respect to the centre of the image is 14.25 degrees (standard deviation =
8.69 degrees). The average discrepancy for what concerns the distance with respect to the centre of the
image instead is 205.40 pixels (standard deviation = 33.59 pixels). This implies that the dynamics of the
H2 neurons are transformed, with respect to the dynamic of the sensory neuron R and B, so to preserve
angular information that is crucial for the accomplishment of the task. This is, again, an essential aspect
of the motor-oriented encoding.
Overall these results indicate that the individuals belonging to the third family rely on an internal
model that anticipates how the state of the sensors varies as a result of the execution of the current
planned action. Rather than anticipating the exact value that the sensors would have assumed, however,
the internal model anticipates more abstract properties of the sensory flow, namely its phase variation
as well as information that provide an indication of the current angular position of the eye with respect
to the centre of the image. Here “abstractions” are sensory abstractions (e.g., the phase with which
sensory states vary over time rather than the exact value of the stimuli), which capture the regularities
that make the agent able to act in similar ways with and without sensory stimuli (this is why we
consider this encoding motor-oriented rather than being aimed to reconstruct the details of the sensory
stimulations). This, in turn, might imply that anticipation can constitute a route to sensory abstraction,
and to perceptual capabilities that goes beyond the mere reconstruction of sensory stimuli.
There are several reasons that might explain while evolved agents anticipate abstract properties of the
forthcoming stimuli rather than the actual stimuli. A first reason is that predicting the detailed character-
istics of the next stimuli is more difficult than predicting only selected properties of them (Schmidhuber
and Prelinger, 1993; Nolfi and Tani, 1999). A second reason is that predicting only the functionally
relevant properties is more parsimonious. A third reason is that predicting something different from the
actual sensory state allows to encode information to be predicted in a way that simplifies the use of
this information for triggering the appropriate motor action; we consider it a motor-oriented encoding.
Indeed, the stimuli self-generated by our evolved robots are easier to discriminate, with respect to their
natural counterpart, since they vary more sharply within a larger range (fig. 10). Overall this means that
only the essential characteristics of the stimuli are anticipated in a form that simplifies their use, while
at the same time it permits to (re)generate appropriate behavior.
3.2 Analysis of the second family of solutions (Architecture C)
We now describe the characteristics of the agents belonging to the second family of solutions. As stated
above, also some of the individuals belonging to the second family display the ability to master relatively
long blind phases through the generation of a self-sustained activity. Moreover, the analysis of the corre-
lation over time of the state of the two additional motor neurons and the state of the two corresponding
sensory neurons indicates that, also most of the individuals belonging to the second family anticipate
the phase with which sensory state vary over time (more precisely phase anticipation is observed in the
best evolved individuals of 10 out of 13 replications of the experiment belonging to the second family).
Finally, also in the case of second family, self-generated states experienced during blind phases differ
significantly from the real sensory states experienced during normal phases.
Differently from the third family, however, the individuals belonging to the second family display
rather different motor behaviours during normal and blind phases. This can be clearly seen, for example,
by comparing the motor trajectories (Fig. 14, left) and the Fourier transform analysis of the motor
actions (Fig. 14, right) during normal and blind phases in the case of the best individual of replication
4.
While in the individuals belonging to the third family the problem caused by the lack of sensory














































Fig. 12 Correlation over time between the states of the H2 neurons and the states of the two corresponding sensors.
Analysis performed on the data collected for 1000 time steps during a normal and a blind phase (left and right pictures,
respectively). During blind phases, the state that the sensors would had assumed if the agent were not blind were used. The
light and dark line indicate the correlation of the first or of the second sensor and H2 neuron, respectively. The analysis
has been repeated by shifting the output sample window of k steps, where k varies from -50 to 50. The position of the peek
along the x-axis indicates the extent of the anticipation (for value below 0) or of the delay (for value above 0). Note that
the peak at 0 indicates that the phase of variation of the additional output neurons anticipates the phase of variation of
the sensory neurons of 1 time step.





































Fig. 13 Left: The graph shows how the position of the eye on the image, corresponding to the state of the H2 neurons,
varies during a normal and blind phases lasting 1000 time steps (black and gray lines respectively). X and Y axis indicate
the position along the two corresponding axis obtained by normalizing the state of the H2 neurons within the [0,500] range,
i.e. within the range of variation of the red and blue gradients over the 500x500 pixel image. Right: the graph shows how
the state of the motor neurons varies over time during a normal and blind phases lasting 1000 time steps.
equivalent to the missing sensory states (i.e. that trigger the same motor actions during normal and blind
phases), in the individuals belonging to the second family the problem is solved through the generation
of a self-sustained activity and through the development of two different behavioural strategies that lead
to the exhibition of two qualitatively different solutions for normal and blind phases. In other words,
self-generated stimuli play different roles in the third and second families, and are used to generate the
same behaviour in the former but not the latter.
Before concluding this section is important to clarify that, although we believe that the discrimination
of solutions in three classes is useful to understand the mechanisms that allow individuals to solve the
task, there are no clear-cut boundaries between different families. Indeed, for individuals that display
similar, but not very similar, behaviour during normal and blind phases, the categorization into family
two or three is somewhat arbitrary. Similarly, individuals displaying short term self-sustained dynamics
which allow them to master successfully short blind phases can be categorized between family one and
two.
4 Discussion
The obtained results demonstrate how some of the evolved robots manage to solve their task also when
they are temporarily ’blindfolded’ and to appropriately master the transition between normal and blind
phases. However, only some of these robots — those belonging to the third family — solve the problem
15







































































Fig. 14 Left: Behaviour displayed by the best individual of the replication number 4 (dmotorsfft = 0.70, ρmotorsfft =
0.21) during a test in which normal and blind phase last 1000 time steps. Right: Fourier transform of M1 and M2 over time
for the best individual of replication 4, belonging to the second family. The top and bottom figures correspond to the data
collected during a normal and a blind phase, respectively, lasting 1000 time steps.
by producing the same behaviour during normal and blind phases. We argue that robots belonging to
the third family rely on an internal model that has the following characteristics:
– It is autonomously developed depending on the demands of the agent-environment interactions rather
than externally designed. Indeed, individuals have not been rewarded for the ability to predict the
state of forthcoming stimuli.
– It is primarily driven by its own dynamic properties, and can be triggered by both external and inter-
nal, self-generated inputs. It is self-sustained, i.e. it can (re)generate similar dynamics and behavior
by using self-produced rather than external stimuli.
– It generates and relies on abstract motor-oriented states rather than on states that mimic in details
the characteristics of sensory stimuli.
– It has anticipatory nature, since it correlates with future stimuli more than with past or present
stimuli, and can be self-sustained by using predicted sensory stimuli instead of ‘real’ sensory stimuli.
Note that the anticipatory nature, defined as the ability to generate future stimuli on the basis of
previously experience stimuli, is not the only way to solve the adaptive task. Indeed, robots could
rely on alternative strategies that, for example, determine the appropriate action on the basis of the
previously executed actions, as in the case of the study reported in (Ziemke et al., 2002, 2005).
The solutions belonging to the second family, instead, lack at least one of the features that we
considered essential for a full-fledged internal model: the ability to support the same (or similar) behavior
interchangeably both in the presence of external and self-generated stimuli. Although the lack of this
feature does not necessarily lead to a lower performance in the experimental setting considered in this
paper, it other cases in might prevent a flexible reuse of their self-generated stimuli. For example, it might
prevent the possibility to effectively fuse sensed and self-generated stimuli to reduce the unreliability of
sensory information (as is done in models based on Kalman filters). Similarly it might prevent the
possibility to use external, goal stimuli as reference signals for inferring intentional action, an aspect
that is essential in closed-loop and ideomotor theories (Adams, 1971; Hommel et al., 2001). Furthermore,
it prevents using predictions for cancelation of self-produced stimuli (Blakemore et al., 1998).
5 Conclusions
Theoretical studies suggest that internal models could have originated in living organisms for the sake of
adaptive behavior, not for cognition, and were than exapted for advanced cognitive and social operations
(Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2007, 2009). Unfortunately, little effort has been devoted to the verification
of this idea–something that is admittedly very complicated by using empirical means, but is more feasible
by using the methodology of evolutionary robotics (Nolfi and Floreano, 2000), which we adopted in this
study.
The central hypothesis that motivated our design methodology is that a (temporary) deprivation
of external stimuli and the possibility to substitute the missing sensory information with self-generated
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internal states can create the adaptive conditions for the development of an internal model in an embodied
and situated agent even in absence of any explicit reward for prediction. The rationale behind this
hypothesis is that the agent will first develop a strategy which is effective when sensory stimulation
is available. The development of such strategy might then channel the adaptive process toward the
development of an ability to self-generate sensory information, which is temporarily not available, rather
than toward the development of a two different motor strategies able to operate effectively when sensory
information is or is not available, respectively.
The obtained results demonstrated that indeed, a population of agents evolved for the ability to
perform an exploration task display an ability to solve the task during both normal and blind phases
(i.e. during phases in which sensory stimulation is temporarily not available). Moreover the analysis of
the strategy adopted by the best evolved individuals demonstrate how, in some cases, they solve their
task through the development of an internal model that has anticipatory aspects, can be (temporarily)
detached from the current sensorimotor flow, and endogenously reactivated by self-generated signals. It
is worth mentioning that, as testified by the presence of three families of solutions, and by the results of
the study reported in (Ziemke et al., 2002, 2005), the arose of internal modeling strategy (in the sense
we have described here) is far from trivial, and it is not simply dictated by our particular architectural
choices. In other terms, certain architectural constraints, such as the availability of a gating/regulatory
mechanisms that allows the agent to neglect sensory or self-generated states during blind and normal
phases, could indeed be necessary conditions for the arose of internal models, but they are certainly not
sufficient.
Given the similarities between the specific problems solved by living organisms during natural evolu-
tions, and by the artificial agents described here, our results support the hypothesis that internal models
might had originated for motor control and might have been exapted for additional cognitive and so-
cial functions later on. Moreover, we have demonstrated that an ability to anticipate can evolve even
if the agents are not directly rewarded for predicting the forthcoming stimuli, providing that there are
compelling environmental conditions.
At a general level of description, this study can be situated within a new tendency in cognitive
science that take an ecological perspective in which cognitive processes are integrated with behavioural
and ultimately sensorimotor processes. Within this area, some studies tend to frame the issue at a
theoretical level (Clark and Grush, 1999; Keijzer, 2001; Grush, 2004; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2007,
2009), while other studies (Tani, 1996, 2003; Beer, 2003; Nolfi, 2005; Tani et al., 2008; Moller and
Schenck, 2008; Gigliotta and Nolfi, 2008; Gigliotta et al., 2010; Johnsson et al., 2009), including the
present article, attempt to come up with complete and detailed models implemented in embodied agents
that are situated in an external environment with which they interact.
In that respect, it is important to notice that the realization and the analysis of models implemented
in embodied and situated agents can support or disconfirm alternative theoretical models and/or can
highlight aspects that need to be incorporated in these abstract models. For instance, the results described
in this paper support the hypothesis that internal models might had arisen for compensating the problems
caused by the temporary unavailability of sensory information and the hypothesis that internal model
can operate by producing a one-step prediction at the level of raw sensory data. However they disconfirm
the assumption, often made implicitly, that anticipation should be realized by generating states that
encode the anticipated information in the same way in which it is encoded in sensors.Moreover, our
results demonstrate that the presence of a learning mechanism that drive the learning process on the
basis of the prediction error (i.e. the difference between predicted and actual sensory states) does not
necessarily represent a prerequisite for the development of an anticipatory capability.
The possible representational role of internal modeling As remarked in sec. 1, some researchers attribute
a representational role to internal modeling, and most notably Grush (2004) in his ‘emulation theory
of representation’. Unfortunately, the term ‘representation’ is inflated in cognitive science. It is worth
noting, however, that the internal models that we observe in the third family of solutions met all the
criteria for representationality that are accepted in a variety of approaches. First, not only they correlate
with external events, but they causally determine behavior. As many philosophers have argued, causal
role is one important criterion that distinguish representations from mere correlations (Dretske, 1981;
Millikan, 2004). Second, the internal models go beyond causal power in that they also allow ‘internal’
manipulations, in the sense that they permit closing the sensorimotor loop internally, or without receiving
external stimuli. This fact is compliant with the foundational idea in cognitive science, which can be
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traced back at least to (Piaget, 1954), that the ability to act on internal representations rather than (or
before than) in the external reality is one of the hallmarks of cognition and autonomy.
In addition, one intriguing property of the evolved internal models is that not only they facilitate
motor execution and control when coupled with the external environment but, under certain conditions
(e.g., when the robot is blindfold), they can self-sustain, so that they afford action in absence of external
stimuli, or when the agent is detached from the external environment. Crucially, this dual property of
coupling and detachment makes internal models ideal candidates to support many more on-line and
off-line processes. Several researches have recently argued that off-line reuse and reenactment of internal
models is the ideal candidate for the passage from sensorimotor to more advanced cognitive capabilities.
Some examples of ‘cognitive’ reuses of internal models that have been recently advanced are off-line
motor planning by chaining multiple predictions and inhibiting external inputs and motor commands
(see e.g., Jeannerod, 2006; Nishimoto and Tani, 2009; Pezzulo, 2008), as well as advanced social skills
such as mindreading and imitation (see e.g., Hurley, 2008; Oztop et al., 2005; Wolpert et al., 2003).
Although our experiments did not address directly any of these abilities, and acting blindfold is,
admittedly, only one example of internal models ‘reuse’, it is worth noting that it is not qualitatively
different from more sophisticated forms of reuse such as motor planning or motor imagery. Indeed, even
in our experiments it is required that the agent ‘closes’ its (sensorimotor) loop internally, in the internal
model, instead than externally (in the world, via its actions and the feedback it receives); see (Grush, 2004;
Hesslow, 2002; Jeannerod, 2006; Pezzulo, 2011; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009) for further discussions
on the off-line reuse of internal modeling for higher-level cognitive abilities, and (Pezzulo, 2008) for a
preliminary study on this topic.
Finally, one last point that we would like make is the fact that the model proposed in this paper
might also represent an effective methodology for an engineering perspective, i.e. from the point of view
of developing autonomous robots than can operate reliably in uncontrolled conditions. Indeed, the ability
to overcome the problems caused by the fact that sensory information is temporarily unavailable (for
example, due to visual occlusions, incompleteness and/or noise) represents a crucial prerequisite for the
possibility to tackle a large variety of potentially useful applications.
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